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Introduction
In the wake of two major terrorist attacks in the past year, the presence in France of a
large Arab-Muslim population has gained new global attention. The worst attack in decades took
place January 7, 2015 when two gunmen slaughtered 10 employees of the satirical magazine
Charlie Hebdo. Later that same year six coordinated attacks hit Paris on November 13. The night
ended with 130 dead and hundreds more wounded. Whether or not the perpetrators of these
events held French or other European nationalities, their names and faces all said “Arab” to the
public and raised questions about immigration, terrorism, Islam and the presence and status of
Arab-Muslims in France. These questions are nothing new, even if they seem to take on new
urgency. One could look back to the Clichy-sous-Bois riots in 2005, or farther back to the
famous “Marche des Beurs” in 19831 or even farther back to the October 17, 1961 massacre of
Algerians in Paris. Even when not exploding in riots and bombings, the colonial bond between
France, Tunisia, Morocco and especially Algeria resulted in discrimination, oppression and hard
feelings between native French and newcomers and their children. France relinquished its
colonial empire in 1962 but even into the twenty-first century, these difficulties extend beyond
knee-jerk reactions to terrorism or the contested public housing of impoverished immigrants.
Since North Africans began coming to France in significant numbers in the 1920s and
1930s their place in France has been debated. During the Interwar years, most migrants were
single men working in factories, mines and other menial jobs. Their experience in the French
army gave them a picture of a more generous and welcoming France than they saw in the
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“Marche des Beurs” is the popular name of a “march for equality and against racism” which protested police
violence and poor living conditions in immigrant neighborhoods in the eighties. It was the first national movement
against racism on the part of second generation North African immigrants or “beurs” (French slang for arabe).
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colonies and encouraged more to come from the Maghreb.2 Algeria’s status as three
administrative departments of France since 1848 made migration all the easier.3 Although
deemed the least desirable immigrant group by French scientists, sociologists, and politicians,4
many chose to stay in France and raise their children, and eventually grandchildren, often
holding onto practices and religion from home. After World War II, Algerians, Moroccans, and
Tunisians began to replace Italians, Poles, and Spaniards as the principal immigrant groups. The
post-war economic boom in France and post-independence struggles in the three new nations
drove many to France seeking work, and a policy of family reunification in the seventies allowed
the numbers of Maghrebis to grow and gave them a reason to stay. At the same time, France’s
losses in both World Wars and America’s rise to global prominence fueled fears among a
number of French leaders that the growing immigrant population threatened their idealistic
French way of life, resulting in strict immigration laws, an intensified political-cultural agenda
and at times outright trampling on individual immigrant rights in favor of a culture-based notion
of the “public good.”
As evidenced by conflicting reactions to the Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks, the “Arab
problem” in France is one that continues to this day. Nevertheless, North Africans continue to
come to France for opportunity. Now more than ever though, that opportunity comes in the form
of education rather than work in a mine or factory. Students in undergraduate, masters and
doctoral programs leave home—quite possibly for the first time—and journey across the
Mediterranean to a country they have heard so much about and towards which they probably
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Richard S. Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918, (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 2008)
3
Julia Ann Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an age of migration, 1800-1900, (Los Angeles:
University of California, 2011), Kindle Edition, Loc 2223
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Elisa Camiscioli, Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy, and Embodiment in the Early Twentieth
Century, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009)
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have mixed feelings. Most have family and friends who went before, and they are certainly
aware of the racial tension that continues to so often define France’s interactions with its former
colonial subjects. Their position as international students and part of France’s controversial
“Arab” Muslim population sets them apart from both groups and creates a unique situation for
observation.
As an American exchange student in France I made many North African friends who had
come there for various educational opportunities. As a history major, I began to question their
motives, and wonder how the knowledge of their countries’ shared history with France had an
impact on their decision to study there. Colonialism ended decades ago, but many inequalities
still exist between the “native” French and North African populations. There has been much
research done on North African immigrants to France, on second-generation immigrants, and on
foreign students in general, but I found nothing specifically on North African students in France
nor on the influence of history on any given student group’s experience in any given country.
Even within the friendly, open, international student community in Le Mans, North (and to a
degree West) Africans occupied a different space than the Americans, Germans, or Chinese.
While still foreign students, they often spoke better French, had family already in the country,
and planned to obtain complete degrees in France, as opposed to spending a semester or year
abroad. I had spent time studying the difficulties faced by second-generation Maghrebis but
again, my new friends did not quite fit what I had learned about those born in France or their
parents. The men and women represented in this study are students, often already possessing a
degree of some sort. They are not lower class immigrants coming to work in a factory, they are
not refugees and they are not French-born and fighting for their right to be considered French.
Outside of the boundaries of the University however, they are lumped into the greater category
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of "North Africans in France" even by scholars. They had for the most part not come to France
intending to settle down, but do the French know or care that they are not necessarily immigrants?
How do these students fit into the history of immigration to France and the category of “foreign
student”? How do they situate themselves in the French-North African story and how do they
feel the French see them? What impact does knowledge of their nations’ shared histories have on
their perceptions of themselves, their homes, and France and how does it influence their
experience as students? This thesis sets out to explore these questions on a small scale, using
data collected from personal interviews with Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan students
studying in Paris and Le Mans, France.
Anyone who spends time with North African students in France soon realizes that their
experience differs from that of other international students. Without understanding the historical
circumstances that brought so many of them to France in the first place, however, it would be
difficult to grasp why their experience is so different. Armed with a base knowledge of French
colonialism, French Republican rhetoric, and immigration history, I found historical connections
and themes repeated in all that the students shared about the present. One might blame a global
rise in Islamophobia and fear of terrorism for causing the students to feel ostracized at times, but
it became clear in talking with them that the source is more specific —at least from their point of
view. Richard Derderian, a French historian who works with second-generation immigrants,
quotes the Algerian singer and novelist, Mounsi, saying that the delinquency of secondgeneration Algerians in France today “cannot be understood in isolation from the colonial and
immigrant past.”5 If second-generation North Africans still wrestle with the consequences of a
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Richard L. Derderian, “Confronting the Past: The Memory Work of Second-Generation Algerians in France,” in
Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia, edited by Patricia M. E. Lorcin, 247-256, (Syracuse:
Syracuse University, 2006), 251
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violent past, then those students who come directly from the “colony” must feel it as well. Their
difficulties in France cannot be understood apart from comprehending that past. In a country that
does not even recognize race on the census, why do most of the students feel as though they are
unwanted because of their racial/ethnic background? What would cause a French person to call a
random woman on the subway “a dirty Arab” when France prides itself on “égalité” and
“fraternité”? The French president recently named a Moroccan-born woman the Minister of
Culture, but one of the Moroccan students calls the situation in France “total discrimination”
with regard to North Africans. In the following pages I examine incidents like these in the
context of French and North African history, in order to argue that only in light of the past can
the students, the French and scholars make sense of the complex and often contradictory
relationship which sets this group apart from the larger international student community.
The interviewees themselves showed a lack of personal interest in history and its
influence on the present. Contradictorily, this lack of interest often accompanied explicit or at
times implicit references to how the history of North Africa and France does impact their lives. I
examine the students’ comments thematically, looking at their perceptions of the past, the
lingering effects of a colonizer/colonized relationship, racist French attitudes, the singularity of
Algeria, and religion. Each section begins with a revealing quote from one of the students and
contains relevant information from interviews and questionnaires, all framed by secondary
sources concerning race, immigration, and history in France and North Africa. Before moving
into a discussion of the data, I will discuss the relevance of North African students as a unique
group to study, briefly outline the framework of analysis, and give an overview of my
demographic.

6

Why Students
Most studies about France and its Muslim/Arab population do not consider students as a
separate category of analysis. They focus on those coming to France for work, marriage, or
asylum, on illegal immigrants, or on the children born to immigrants in France. This gap in the
literature is not surprising as until recently, students made up a very small percentage of the
North African migrant population. Most colonial subjects could not read so they had little
interest in coming to France to study. Before 1960, 39% of Algerian urban migrants in France
were illiterate and that number rose to 62% in rural communities.6 Those who did come to
France for higher education often returned home and became leaders of independence
movements across North Africa, putting their new ideas about democracy, self-determination,
and equality into practice by overthrowing French control. After independence, education
became more available in French and Arabic and the numbers of students began to rise. Today,
North Africans make up the largest percentage of foreign students in France. Perhaps the
temporary status of students causes their importance to be undervalued, but they do contribute
significantly to the overall Muslim population in France, even if only for a transitory period. The
lines between student and immigrant can also be unclear: choosing to stay because of marriage
or job opportunities is not uncommon. A long-stay visa for studies is the first step to a residence
permit and remaining in France indefinitely.
Between 2006 and 2011, 43% of all visas issued went to foreign students obtaining firsttime long-term visas to study in France.7 A long-stay visa is required for a student to live in
France for longer than 3 months and expires after a year. Five countries supplied just under half
of those long-stay students: China, United States, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The first two
6

Gérard Noirel, Atlas de l’immigration en France: exclusion, intégration, (Paris: Editions Autrement, 2002), 32.
Main Study, “Immigration of International Students to France,” (French Contact Point of the European Migration
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have larger populations overall from which to pull study-abroad students, but the last three still
make up the largest percentages of international students in France. Of the 218,364 foreign
students enrolled in French universities in 2010, the top four countries of origin included
Morocco with 11%, Algeria with 8% and Tunisia with 5%. China was in second place with
10%.8 These numbers shifted a bit in 2014, but the overall percentage of Maghrebi students
stayed about the same (21%) as shown by Table 1. The table also shows each country’s students
in France as a percentage of the total number of students abroad.
Table 1

Number of
students in
France
(2014)9
% of
foreign
students in
France
% of
students
abroad in
France
(2014)
% of
students
receiving
first-time
residence
permits
(2010)10
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Morocco

Algeria

Tunisia

China

United
States

23 617

17 466

8 925

25 234

3 204

10%

7%

4%

11%

1%

61%
(of 38 599)

84%
(of 20 695)

53%
(of 16 889)

4%
(of 712 157)

5%
(of 60 292)

10%

8%

4%

16%

5%

Ibid, 46
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “Global Flow of Tertiary Students,” (March 2, 2016),
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx
10
Main Study, 41
9
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In addition to comprising a large percentage of international students in France, Maghrebi
students also receive the most financial aid to study there. Every year the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs distributes 16,000 scholarships and grants to cover the costs of education and living
expenses for foreign students. Maghrebi students make up 20% of grant recipients and Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia are the top three countries represented, respectively.11
While not grossly over represented, North African students still comprise a significant
portion of the international student population and there is little explanation for this outside of
far-reaching historical connections. One could argue for language, societal similarities, or
political agreements (and some of the interviewees do) but none of these can be separated from
their historical contexts. The EMN Main Study and the Campus France Notes on international
students in France consistently place the Maghreb in a separate category from the rest of Africa
and the Middle East when discussing data, further reflecting the region’s unique history and
relationship with France. It is worth noting that while all international students wishing to pursue
a bachelors or masters in France must receive a long-stay, renewable visa, this does not apply to
Algerians, whose status is covered by the Franco-Algerian Agreement of December 27, 1968.
This official differentiation of Algerian students reflects the special place Algeria holds in
French history and memory.
The students may be unique among North Africans in France because of their status as
students, but in their daily lives there is little distinction,12 and their experience differs greatly
from their Chinese and American counterparts. All of the students in this study but one told
stories of hearing comments like “dégage” (get out!), or other racist remarks, something that a
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Ibid, 29 The study did not indicate if this was because these students have the most need or if they were simply
more likely to apply than other national groups.
12
Much has been written elsewhere on the situation of North African and Arab immigrants and their children living
in France and some will be explored throughout later sections of this paper.
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Chinese student may experience but an American certainly would not. Experiences of racism
affect them all, but do not discourage most of them from wanting to stay. According to the EMN
study, more North African students stay in France after graduation than any other group. Of the
9,500 who changed to employee status in 2011, North Africans again made up the majority, with
18.5% being Moroccan, 14.1% Algerian, and 9.5% Tunisian (Chinese students were third with
10.7%).13 Again, these are not overwhelming numbers, but it is because of the large numbers of
North African Arabs and Berbers already in France that these students stand out. According to
2008 census data 1,602,000 Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians live in France, and Algerians
constitute 13% of all immigrants, which is same percentage as all other African nationalities
combined.14 This number is only counting those born outside of France and does not take into
account all of the children and grandchildren of former immigrants.
Framework and limitations
In her book, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial
Rule, Ann Stoler features a chapter on oral history and memory work with elderly Javanese,
former domestic workers for Dutch colonials. She looks at perceptional dissonance between
what the Dutch reported and what the Indonesians remembered (or chose to remember) about
colonialism, finding a contrast between the cozy, sentimental memories of the Dutch and the
cold, business-minded recollections of the Javanese.15 However, Stoler also found variation
within Javanese memories. She cautions the historian against approaching memory work with
too much assurance of finding “colonial memories,” a term she problematizes by explaining that
the memories themselves are impacted by imperialist structures and not all will fit into the “great
13

Main Study, 64
«Immigrés et descendants des immigrés en France. » Fiches thématiques : population immigré. Table 1. 2012.
101. http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/ref/IMMFRA12_g_Flot1_pop.pdf
15
Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, (Berkeley:
University of California, 2002), 164
14
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narrative or counter narrative.”16 My work does not fit into the category of memory work in the
same way hers does, since I am asking students about their current experiences and their
knowledge about a past they themselves cannot remember. Nonetheless, like Stoler, I did not
find a “shared” narrative told by the students about their time in France, but received mixed
feedback and emotional responses. Because of the personal and limited nature of the interviews,
this study will not attempt to make any overreaching claims about North African students in
France as a whole, but will endeavor to connect individual experiences with the larger narrative
of North African interaction with France. Plenty has been written about France and North
Africans, but this paper will allow the theories and themes to be explored on a personal level.
How the students see themselves in France, how they feel the French see them, and how they
view the history between the two regions confirms and challenges the secondary sources even as
the secondary sources help clarify and explain what the students say. I found that in spite of the
students’ efforts to remain grounded in the present, their different experiences and contradicting
reactions cannot be separated from the historical baggage carried by France and North Africa.
Demographic
In all, 12 students were interviewed, including 6 females and 6 males and 3 Moroccans, 1
Tunisian and 8 Algerians. Of the interviewees, 5 are my close friends and the others are friends
of those friends or casual acquaintances made while studying abroad. Eight students studied in
the mid-sized town of Le Mans in the Loire valley and the other 4 in Paris. Paris receives a lot of
media attention for its large population of Maghrebis (the highest concentration in France) and is
of course the first place most people think of when they hear “France.” Contrary to popular
belief, it does not, in fact, represent the whole nation. Incorporating students from Le Mans, a
city of about 150,000, far from Paris and its infamous banlieues, brings more depth to the study
16

Ibid, 169
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by providing examples of different types of exclusion outside of Paris. All of the students but
two came to France for the sole purpose of completing one or more degrees and all but one came
to France within the last 5 years. As I refer to the thoughts and opinions of each student, I will
use pseudonyms to protect anonymity. Some students were much more forthcoming than others
on their questionnaires and some I knew personally, which allowed me to have more insight into
their situations. I have included a brief biography of each respondent as an appendix as well as a
sample of my questions. I conducted Skype interviews with Abdullah and Ahmed, thanks to the
close friendship we developed while I was in France. The rest of the students filled out a detailed
questionnaire and responded to further questions over email.
Overview
Overall the students have had positive experiences in France, and some plan to stay
indefinitely. Since our time together in France, Ahmed has graduated and now lives and works in
Paris. Mona’s parents live in Le Mans, so she plans to stay in Europe if not necessarily in France.
Nora has also settled down in Le Mans since I met her, marrying a cousin and having a baby.
Except for Raina, Lais, and Abdullah, the rest expressed willingness if not a strong desire to live
in France, especially if the right job presents itself. Despite wanting to stay, all but one expressed
that they feel the French see Arab/Muslim culture as “inferior,” “unacceptable,” bizarre,” or
“incomprehensible,”17 and most have been victims of blatant racism in one form or another.
According to Mohamed, the hardest thing about living in France is “accepting each day that one
is not welcome [here].” Despite this and despite multiple references to the colonization of their
countries, none of the students expressed sharp disdain for France, its culture, or its people and
repeatedly said that one finds good and bad people everywhere. However, I found that the more
closely I knew the interviewee, the more heartfelt and in-depth his or her responses were, and the
17

Aisha, questionnaire, October 25, 2015
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more likely he or she seemed to share difficulties and frustrations. It was interesting to compare
the replies of some on the questionnaire with our interactions in France. Mohamed, for example,
was always very pleasant and involved on campus. I did not expect to hear him say he felt
unwelcome in France, which caused me to wonder if he exaggerated his stories to tell me what
he thought I wanted to hear. One of the questions explicitly asked about personal experiences of
racism, and Mohamed started his story with “Finally, a direct question…”18 The rest of his
answers mixed praise of France with censure of an institutionalized discrimination. The balance
of his criticism with praise (which I found in all the students’ responses) spoke against
exaggeration and increased my interest in his choice of France for studies. He even assured me
that other foreign students “coming from the entire world” agree with him that they are not
welcome in France. Of the students in this study, all except Nora insisted that they encountered
kind and welcoming French people, and a few of them did not have any bad experiences to share
at all. Nevertheless, even those who like France and adamantly want to stay expressed awareness
of, if not exasperation with, what they consider a general attitude of distaste and closemindedness towards their culture, religion, and people.
An oft repeated accusation was that the French “generalize” and believe everything they
see in the media. The students worked hard to avoid complete generalizations themselves, more
than one qualifying their stories of being treated poorly with the phrase “you find bad and good
people everywhere,” as if to insist that they recognize that not all French people are racist.
Seeking to understand prejudice does not mean it does not bother them though. Ahmed shared:
“On the one hand I understand, on the other I don’t agree. If you’ve never met a Muslim, you
only see terrorism, you see what is said in the media and you believe it and you think that
Muslims are all monsters. You think that they are all monsters. But why do people generalize?
18

Mohammed, questionnaire, February 7, 2016
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That’s what I don’t like.”19 Certain students made comments that suggest more bias than they
claimed. Abdullah seems predisposed to think all French are closed minded, full of
generalizations, and raised to be afraid of Arabs. In our interview he referenced a French friend,
saying that he jokes with him that he is not really French because of his openness and
friendliness. I heard him make similar statements about one or two other girls with whom we
spent time at the University. When he related how a co-worker jokingly told him that he looks
like a terrorist, he admitted to being shocked and hurt, but said, “I will not judge her because she
was raised this way. Her parents were talking about this. This is a terrorist, this is an Arabic
mother f**ker and you know, she’s so naïve…imagine people saying this and you’re two years
old…”20 Others made references to how people are raised, the media, religion, and cultural
differences in order to explain feeling excluded and disdained by the French. Some of the
students also invoked historical explanations to make sense of their place in France today, but
few of them said more than a general “colonialism makes them racist.” The question remains,
why are some French people raised to see North Africans as violent or less civilized and what
about their relationship causes the students to accuse the French of generalizing while
simultaneously explaining it and trying to avoid similar generalizations? The remainder of this
thesis will seek to explain the unique relationship between North African students and their
French hosts through the prism of history, and argues that without an understanding of history,
this complicated and contradictory relationship does not make sense. A few of the students
grasped the importance of history more than others and one in particular repeatedly and
consciously connected his present day suffering to a colonial past. For the rest, it was usually
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Ahmed, skype interview with author, November 3, 2015
Abdullah, skype interview with the author, September 12, 2015 Because of his education, we spoke both French
and English during our interviews and he could swear fluently in both languages. His exact word choice here was
“mother f**ker.” All communication with the other interviewees was in French.
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enough to say that “the French are prejudiced,” maybe adding “because of a history of
colonialism.” Their comments about history, however, make it clear that they situate their
experiences today within that history and use it to make sense of what they see as otherwise
senseless behavior by certain French people.
“Anyone who wants to leave Algeria is going to think of France. This is our mentality…I’m
going to Europe and Europe is what? Europe is France. There’s a, how do you say, there’s
a link between Algeria and France. Spain is good…but they don’t go there because there’s
no link…from independence people just wanted to go to France…they stereotype like [sic]
France, France, France for Algerians…” –Abdullah.21
When students leave the Maghreb, the vast majority go to France. Algeria has the highest
percentage of any country with 89% of those studying overseas choosing France.22 Fifty years
after independence, France also remains each country’s most important bilateral trading partner.
For the most part, the students’ understanding of this link is based on language, culture, and
family but they made many references to the past in their responses to questions which only
asked about the present. The most common reason most of the interviewees gave for why
students from North Africa choose France for studies is because of the shared language and/or
social and historical links between their country and France. A few referred to the fact that
everyone knows someone in France—an aunt, cousin, or neighbor. But even that is closely
connected to a shared history, and the ones whom I know for certain have family there seemed to
take it for granted and did not even mention it. Hisham also said that despite many differences,
his culture resembles France’s because “they lived in our land for 130 years and we kept some of
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Skype interview with the author, September 12, 2015
Campus France, “La mobilité des étudiants d’Afrique sub-saharienne et du Maghreb,” Les Notes de Campus
France, Yoann Le Bonhomme, Oumou Diakité, Raphaëlle Hallier and Laura Foka, ISSN. 2117-8348, (Paris : Studio
Boss, Juin 2013), 2 http://www.campusfrance.org/sites/default/files/note_07_hs_Afrique.pdf
22
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their culture.”23 Mohammed gave better education and life experiences as reasons to go to France,
adding “…that it’s a question of histories and that France is indebted to the countries of the
Maghreb because she colonized them for a brief moment and it’s thanks to the Maghreb that
France was able to win her former world wars.”24 Here we see an acknowledgement of the “brief”
historical period of colonization but also an allusion to the former colonies’ role in the World
Wars, a chapter of history to which only he referred. Mona, when speaking about Moroccan
stereotypes of the French, said she found that they behave coldly “towards the citizens of a
formerly colonized country.”25 In discussing why some French are racist towards North Africans,
she described how she sees a fear of Islam and a misunderstanding of Arab-Muslim culture,
finishing with “colonization has left is marks on these people.” In response to the same question,
Raina made an explicit connection between history and racism:
In my opinion the French are racist following an old heritage and way of life. Certainly
the state’s place as a world power at the time [of colonization] as well as their role of
colonizer of third world countries taught the French, even simple citizens, to act as
managers of the colonies inhabitants and this direction has evolved into a relation
between ‘the master’ and the employees but unfortunately these habits have been
inherited by the French and that’s why the elderly are racist.26
She also said later that culture and lifestyle in Tunisia and France are very similar because of
colonization.
Others feel the connection even if they did not try to explain it. Ahmed said that he did
not have much culture shock “because of the link between North Africa and France,” which
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creates many similarities between their cultures. Tamir took it a step farther, repeating that he
“knew France” (connaissait la France) before coming, so he did not encounter culture shock or
unfulfilled expectations. In his opinion, students come to France from Algeria because their
culture is “nearly the same” (quasi-pareille), and historically the two countries share many
common points. These students made no mention of why or how Algeria resembles France in
some ways even though a violent colonial regime created most of the similarities. Whether they
fully appreciate and acknowledge the past or not, it is clear from the students’ comments that the
history between France and North Africa colors their perceptions and opinions about France and
their place there.
So what exactly are these “links” the students speak of between France, Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia? A few said that geographic proximity is important, but proximity alone
does not account for such a vast majority of North African students choosing to study in France
or for most foreign students in France come from North Africa. Even the fact that they go
because of language only makes sense in a historical context—North Africa speaks French
because France colonized it. If it is simply a question of geography or language, then why do
only negligible percentages of French students head across the Mediterranean to study in North
Africa?27 Again, historically, there a widespread notion existed that the only things worth
learning originate in France and Europe, so French and Europeans have little motivation to go
south. The histories of both France and North Africa are long and varied, so for the purposes of
this paper I will present only a brief account from their first significant contact in 1830 to the
present to provide perspective into why so much ties the two regions together.

27
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While not originally Arab, the Maghreb had been conquered by Arab tribes in the seventh
century and then ruled by the Ottoman Empire from the 16th century until French occupation.
Ottoman rule was distant, and, compared to what came later, non-intrusive. In 1830, French
troops took Algiers and quickly replaced the Ottoman structure with direct French political and
military control. They encouraged European settlement, used oppressive measures to subdue the
native population, and finally incorporated Algeria into France as three departments. If asked,
most Frenchmen before 1956 and would have said the Algeria was France and anyone born there
was French—as least by nationality. Arabs and Berbers fell under the category of “French
Muslim” and did not actually hold citizenship, subjecting them to most of the inconveniences of
being “French” without any of the benefits.28 Sephardic Jews gained full citizenship in 1870,
creating more division within the colony. In all, France maintained tight political, economic, and
even cultural control of Algeria for 132 years.
The taking of Algeria predated the European grab for land in Africa which drove
involvement in Morocco and Tunisia. One does not want to make light of the latter two nations’
colonial experiences because France did assume full political control through protectorates in
1881 and 1912 respectively. However, the nature of that control, according to Willis, was
“different and ultimately less destructive to the existing political, economic and social
structures”29 than it was to Algeria. Rather than do away with existing structures and rulers,
France allowed the bey in Tunisia and the king in Morocco to keep their nominal positions and
settled for indirect yet complete control. While still devastating for national development and
identity, when independence came Morocco and Tunisia had more structure and stability and
could move forward a bit more quickly. In Algeria everything political had to be built from
28
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scratch. Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria’s colonial experiences and the differences between them
would have significant consequences later on for relations with France, immigration, and
eventually, student life.
Colonialism reached into every area of North African life, but family history in particular
had less of an impact on the students than I anticipated. Independence only took place sixty years
ago, meaning that most of the students’ grandparents and maybe even parents lived through at
least part of the Algerian War. While I did not ask any questions about family stories, I did
inquire into their families’ reactions to their choosing France for study, expecting to hear how a
parent or uncle or grandma had been horrified and told them not to go, or told them awful stories
about the French. The opposite happened. All of the students said their family was “encouraging”
of their decision. One or two gave more detail such as their family knew it would be good for
their professional formation. In two cases the parents themselves had immigrated to France as
well. It appears that the benefits of education and life in France outweighed any ill feelings or
worries. Or perhaps there are none. I also did not have an equal personal connection with each
student which may have led them to be less forthcoming. My close friendship with Abdullah
throughout my six months in France gives me more insight into his story. His grandfather was a
soldier in the war and expressed some dissatisfaction with him choosing France, but his parents
only felt anxious about their son leaving home for the first time; according to him they never
spoke negatively about France. In fact, he insisted that his parents have never spoken about it at
all, even though his father at least lived through the whole Algerian War.
Abdullah’s experience cannot be applied to the whole group, but the fact that not one
student expressed resistance from his or her family, or even any hesitancy themselves to go to a
country they know as a former colonizer, raises questions about how young North Africans
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understand their history and about how much memory plays a role in their perceptions of France.
In her work on oral histories of Dutch colonization of Indonesia, Ann Stoler found a lack of
interest in history among the young Javanese and reluctance on the part of the elderly to discuss
their experiences under colonial rule.30 This occurred within a specific set of historical, political
and social circumstances, but it is possible that the trauma and violence of North African
liberation have caused many to purposely forget or avoid discussing it. Or as Hisham said: “As
for the history of my country and France, it’s necessary to forget and learn to forgive in order to
move forward and to prevent hate from rising up and to reach the goal of living together.” But
does simply forgetting truly allow moving on? Recent scholarship on France and Algeria has
turned specifically to the role that memory and forgetting play in constructing identity in the
present. Richard Derderian contends that the Algerian War in particular “is a drama that still has
no end in sight” and calls for a complex understanding of the past that allows for good and bad
on both sides.31 He specifically studies the memory work of second-generation Algerians, many
of whom see the past as profoundly shaping their place in France and who seek to create a space
for themselves by giving the past an Algerian voice. As for the French themselves, colonial
involvement was something to be forgotten until recently. Only in 1999 did President Jacques
Chirac publicly acknowledge that the nation fought a war in Algeria and that its generals
regularly used torture to deal with Algerian freedom fighters. David Prochaska claims that
Algeria in particular never experienced a similar public resolution of the conflict and that thanks
to continuing unrest, violence and political conflict in the country, their French encounter
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remains “an open wound requiring immediate attention.”32 The absence of public closure for the
Algerian people as a whole may explain the lack of historical interest expressed by most of the
Algerian students. I will not attempt to apply the same reasoning to the Moroccan and Tunisian
students, whose countries have their own unique relationships and shared memories with France.
A later section will deal with the differences between the Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan
experiences more in depth.
In light of the troubled past between North Africa and France, the students’ reluctance to
completely villainize the French arrested my attention. In my mind they had plenty of cause to
do so. As I continued my research, however, I saw how history again offered an explanation, not
only of present tensions, but of why the students seemed to offer praise and condemnation of
their temporary home in the same breath. The first clue came from reading late twentieth century
analyses of the colonial experience and liberation struggles, notably the works of Frantz Fanon
and Albert Memmi.
“France is so fancier.”—Abdullah33
One of my main questions when approaching this paper was if the French government
historically treated its immigrants terribly and if these students experience so much prejudice and
baggage from the colonial period, why do they choose France for studies? Their countries may
not offer the level of degree they think is necessary for success, but there are other places, so
why France? As outlined above, they feel as though France will be easier because they already
know the language, are familiar with elements of the culture, and most likely know someone, all
advantages unlikely to be found elsewhere in Europe. Some of their responses suggest, however,
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that something beyond those practicalities motivates these students. In analyzing their responses,
I was curious how well these students may fit into Albert Memmi and Frantz Fanon’s framework
for analyzing “the colonized.” Are they still, as a twentieth-century rewrite puts it, wearing white
masks over their brown skin?34 Do these categories (colonizer and colonized) carry any
relevance at all sixty years and two generations after independence?
I owe this line of questioning to my relationships with Abdullah and Ahmed, one of
whom displayed an need to assert his people’s “goodness” and the other who sincerely loved his
country but found it more beneficial to blend in. Fanon stated that colonization created an
inferiority complex in colonized peoples who for decades had ideas drummed into them about
white/European culture being superior. During that time, most fine art and education they
encountered came from the colonizers. They preached a social gospel of “let us help you because
we know better,” which only served to prop up empires. In a French context this became known
as the mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission). Even today, assumptions can be held about the
inhabitants of former colonies. Nora related how a teacher blatantly called her out on the first
day of a class: “a professor said to me ‘has your country started to develop itself a bit?’ It made
me feel uncomfortable in front of the other students.”35 With Fanon’s original idea of insecurity
came a hatred of the self, fueled by rejection by this “superior” culture, coupled with a desire to
become a part of it. The liberation movements added a dimension of new-found pride in a
national culture and a rejection of the Other. For example, after independence, Algeria eventually
phased out public French education and now even many universities use only Arabic. National
pride and a sense of insecurity are by no means mutually exclusive, however, and plenty of
34
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examples exist of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria both rejecting and seeking to “catch-up” to
France. Continuing on the theme of language, Morocco, where the “Arabization” of education
began in the 1960’s, recently decided to switch back to French instruction in math, sciences, and
technology.36 For some, this was a practical move to advance important topics more globally
taught in French and English; for others, it represents a step backwards in the fight to promote
the national culture and language.37
With the students I interviewed, I noticed certain contradictions in their comments and
different ways of describing France which may exemplify the struggle faced by citizens of
developing countries who come into contact with Europe or the United States. They spoke of
France with a mixture of condemnation and admiration which seemed like more than a young
person’s comparison of two cultures. The first thing that stood out in nearly all the questionnaires
and conversations was complaints about a lack of compassion, warmth and generosity on the part
of the French which was paired with a desire to maintain their own cultural values. Words used
to describe France included “interesting,” “modern,” “innovating,” and an “open” and “rich”
culture. The group repeatedly expressed admiration of France’s administrative organization,
economy, technology, government, education and place in the world. Even the most committed
to their roots realize that at the very least the world does not see them the same as it sees France.
Mohamed put his position plainly: “I see myself as the special envoy sent on a special mission to
acquire knowledge and return home to apply it and pass it on to future generations.”38 He also
stated that, “I would certainly say that in France the quality of teaching is superior, and
personally I am very lucky and indebted to France for the quality of education she gives me.”
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This is the same young man who said that France is indebted to the colonies for helping her fight
wars. So which is it?
Mona and Ahmed both commented on the corruption and inequality in their own
governments which they find absent in France. Mona also said she learned “rational thought”
from France.39 There is an idea here that much can be learned from France or Europe that cannot
be learned at home and it is important to move forward with that knowledge. The force of the
students’ censure of certain French attitudes and cultural points suggests that each one made a
judgement call: pride and love of home and frustration with France do not outweigh the
perceived benefits of a French education and exposure to European culture. Aisha effectively
summed up a sentiment I perceived in much of the group: “Now I no longer like my country...I
have a good ability to adapt…I am not looking to integrate and adapt 100 percent to this culture
so I always hold onto my values and principles and do not hesitate to show my culture.”40 She
feels this way in spite of the fact that some French person told her “dégage!” (Get out!). Ahmed
also intends to stay in France but still insists "You can never separate me from Algeria."41
In The Wretched of the Earth Fanon calls on the formerly colonized to stop envying or
fearing the colonizer and become a new man. I do not know if he has read Fanon, but Abdullah
captured some of that spirit in our discussions of colonization and racism. He also seemed to feel
a need to prove himself and his culture to the West, be that to me and other Americans or to
France and Europe. I noticed that anytime we watched television and something came on the
news about Islam and terrorism, Abdullah became upset and often changed the channel or left
the room. It bothered him to see his culture and religion represented incorrectly, whether that be
as jihad-obsessed terrorists, or oppressive to women, or simply not following the Quran. He
39
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seemed to feel it his responsibility as an Algerian in France to represent his country well, to
prove that all Algerians do not “font le bordel.”42 Among the other Muslim North Africans with
whom we spent time he let me know which ones truly could be called Muslim and which ones he
felt did not represent Islam well (for him, race, religion, and exclusion by the French are
inextricably linked). He also made a point in his interview that his parents have never spoken
badly about France and suggested that in reality, the French are barbaric for sowing seeds of
prejudice in their children. “When I was young, my mother always told me you must never hit,
it’s out of the question that you hit women…Here the mother tells her child, Arabs are terrorists,
Muslims are terrorists…Who is agreeable here? People who say the good to their children [sic]
or those who say nonsense?”43 In our interviews, he became most passionate and agitated when
talking about colonization or when relating how different French friends misunderstand and
misrepresent his culture. These stories rolled out, one after another, told with much hand
gesturing and stumbling over words, mixing French and English. He insisted that Algerians are
good, generous, giving, and warm (unlike the French) but that the French will never know it
because they generalize.
Abdullah used to tease Ahmed by calling him “the Parisian,” because he moved there
shortly after I arrived and had the strongest mastery of French out of the three of us. Ahmed does
not see the need to advertise that he is Muslim if it will create problems and he does not let the
difficulties of living in France bother him. If he could go anywhere, he would choose America,
but he justifies staying by noting that while racism and difficulties exist in France, he does not
care because in America they do not like Arabs either and he just has to find the best job.
Abdullah on the other hand, made his feelings very clear:
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Sincerely, I will live anywhere, but not France. No. It’s out of the question. I’m just
waiting to finish my thesis and then right after, I’ll go home, I’ll go to Syria, I’ll go
anywhere, shit! I’ll go to an English speaking country you know? It’s more different,
friendlier. That’s it. I’m not going to stay here. I’m not going to stay here.44
At this point in our conversation he was impassioned by discussing how France has treated his
people but at other times he said he would stay in France for a good job, even though he dreams
of Dubai or England. This is one more indication of the complexity and contradictory nature of
these students’ relationship with France. For them, the luxury of personal comfort or preference
takes second place to more practical considerations like economic and educational opportunity.
Some of them take that in stride; others rail against the way the twists and turns of history and
politics brought them to this point. No matter how they choose to respond, they do insist that
there is a link between North Africa and France which brings them there. As seen above, a few
understand the historical roots of that link while others just know they can speak French so
France is the place to go. For these students at least, it would seem that they have made peace
with history (insofar as they know it) and have much more to say about how the French treat
them now. What they may not realize is that the attitudes which frustrate them so much today can
be traced back to the beginnings of France’s colonial empire.
“[The French think] that we are nomads, that we ride camels, that we are disadvantaged
and that they are better than us.” —Mohamed45 “They have an idea that European culture
is superior to other cultures. I’ve heard people say several times that Arab-Muslim culture
is bizarre, horrible, that Arabs are savages.” –Mona. 46
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One remnant from the period of colonialism and imperialism is a lingering idea that
French and European culture and values are universally the best. Coupled with decades of
xenophobic propaganda depicting Muslim Arabs as decidedly unable to be French and therefore
by default inferior and uncivilized, French universalism continues to leave its mark on North
African students, whether or not they actually immigrate. While the majority of French citizens
today probably do not ascribe to the same racial prejudice as their ancestors, most of the students
I interviewed feel as though the French see them and their culture as lesser, some more strongly
than others. I received a range of opinions from calling the situation in France “total
discrimination,”47 to saying that France is not a racist country, but that the French think they are
better than foreigners, “especially Maghrebis.”48 Despite the majority saying that religion
represents the greatest difference between the two cultures, only four gave religion or
islamophobia as the main reason they think many French discriminate towards North Africans.
Most of those who answered that question (3 did not) argued more forcibly that the French
simply think they are better than North Africans, are prejudiced, and do not take the time to
know people. Mona said that they have an idea that “European” is “superior to other cultures”
and that North African culture, language, and tastes are sometimes denigrated. Abdullah actually
insisted during his interview that the French “see Algeria as people who are eating people, yeah
we are like monsters…they think that we don’t have like, fancier lives, like big cars and we have
no books and no literature, no I’m talking seriously…they look at us first of all like a
barbarian…” When I objected that no one thinks they eat people, he insisted: “Yeah of
course…this is the way they think Hannah. I’m not just kidding.”49
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Several interviewees sought to explain and forgive the rudeness and insensitivity they
have experienced, but not one student claimed that North Africans are completely accepted by
French people. As stated above, several of them attribute the lack of acceptance to France’s
historical relationship with North Africa and even if many French people welcome these students,
they cannot erase decades of misunderstanding, oppression, and mistrust that weigh on relations
between the two societies. Historically, it is indisputable that popular French opinion viewed
Arabs as inferior, violent, and less civilized, although the justification has shifted from biological
determinism to questions of culture. French writing on Algeria in the 1800’s presented “the Arab”
as “lazy, soft, slow, always indoors, a dreamer… thieving, false” and “above all, frightening.”50
Attempting to “civilize” him was futile. By the time the first large contingent of North Africans
on French soil came during World War I, the Third Republic idea of a mission civilisatrice
towards their colonial “children” was in full swing, and bringing them “home” to France was
seen not only as necessary, but as a means of educating the uncivilized native.51 In his book on
colonial soldiers during the First World War, Richard Fogarty describes how the rhetoric of
equality in France did allow for more upward mobility and opportunity than in other European
armies. A few students referred to this idea of French equality as something they expected to find
when they came but found the opposite. Others like Raina and Abdullah said they expected more
racism than they found. Alongside his acknowledgement that some French officers tried to treat
North African soldiers as equals, Fogarty gives many examples of officers and officials affirming
the paternalistic and condescending nature of their treatment of colonial soldiers. They refer to
them as “big children” who love “above all to fight”52 and believe them incapable of learning
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specialized tasks or proper French, even though the mission civilisatrice originally assumed the
assimilability of colonial natives. Today, of course, there is no manifest program to “civilize”
North African students in France. Nonetheless, the students feel that their culture is viewed as
inferior to that of France. They may not be aware that for years a systematic program did exist in
France to evaluate various immigrant cultures and decide which groups could meet certain
standards for “civilization” and which were beyond “help.”
Fogarty examines the beginnings of civilizing the colonized at home through the hierarchy
that existed between different groups of colonized soldiers. For example, it was the consensus
that West Africans were good for manual labor, North Africans were fierce warriors, but needed
to be controlled, and Indochinese and Malagasy men were gentle and intelligent. Such racial
hierarchies existed for labor and reproductive potential as well, and Arabs consistently fell to the
bottom of the list. Alongside the soldiers, the war brought 130,000 North Africans as labor
migrants who created conflict and violent unrest in big cities like Paris where their concentrated
presence caused concern among governing officials.53 Government studies continued to find
colonial workers inferior, and the end of the war marked the moment when France’s policy
towards the colonies changed from assimilation to association.54 While up to World War I,
official French policy stated that Arabs could eventually become French (assimilate),
encountering them up close and personal now changed the policy to promoting co-existence as
the only option (association).55 While the two approaches continued to overlap, it had been
legally decided that colonial subjects could never become fully French because of “inherent
biological differences.” As the number of colonial migrants increased to meet labor and
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population demands after the war, French politicians, policemen, and others would scramble to
maintain control and begin to negotiate in earnest what exactly it meant to be French.
The systemic racial profiling of North African migrants only gained importance after the war,
and it is the legacy of these policies that creates so much tension for students and secondgeneration immigrants in France today. During the interwar years, concern about depopulation
prompted the state to encourage foreign immigration and continue creating hierarchies of the
“best” immigrants to integrate into French society. Populationist discourse in Europe linked
demographic strength and productivity to national prominence, so French pronatalists, work and
racial scientists, abolitionists, and politicians set about defining the best way to improve the
quality and quantity of France’s population. This meant submitting colonial subjects and
immigrants to racialized hierarchies that “scientifically” identified white, European immigrants
as better laborers and more fit to reproduce future French citizens. They did everything they
could to send North Africans home right after the war, declaring them too “ethnographically
distinct.”56 Government sponsored studies found Italians, Spanish, and Poles to be most desirable
because they were other “white” races. Their family values and religion also most closely
ressembled those of the French. In contrast, colonial subjects from North Africa were deemed an
unskilled, temporary workforce incapable of assimilating. In her book Reproducing French Race,
Elisa Camiscioli illustrates how French Republicanism’s contradictory values of particularism
and universalism set the tone for these policies. During the nineteenth and twentieth century,
these two ideas developed alongside imperialism and colonialism partially as a justification.
French imperialists praised French language, art, government, and values as the best in the world
but also lauded them as potentially best for the world. According to the pronatalists, work
scientists, hygienists, and racial scientists who discussed immigrant assimilation, French values
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should work for everyone, but they also set France apart and could not be risked by the
integration of “degenerate” groups.57 Actual immigration policies of the period never established
bans or quotas but the desire to create “good” French citizens led to a “biocultural definition of
belonging,” which privileged white Europeans.58 The need for laborers proved stronger than
colonial prejudice, though, and by 1928 at least 60,000 Algerians lived in Paris alone.59 Initially
received with curiosity, they soon replaced Italians as the primary victims of police violence.
Unlike Camiscioli, Paul A. Rosenberg argues that this had more to do with their colonial status
and religious culture than the color of their skin. While “blackness” came at the bottom of all
European racial hierarchies, its meaning was not always clear: some French traditionally saw
Algerian Kabyles as “white,” while they perceived Italians as “black” when they first arrived.60
Whatever color group various North Africans found themselves in, their numbers soon made
Parisians nervous. Evidently neither assimilation nor association sounded as nice when the
“savages” lived down the street, even though at this time Algeria was still considered France,
and Algerians, Arab or European, considered French subjects if not citizens. While
decolonization and a new set of international expectations and values brought changes to the
official policies and rhetoric concerning North Africans and immigrants, hundred-year-old
stereotypes and prejudices were not easily erased. In some ways, the process of decolonization
solidified certain ideas about the place of North Africans in the world in relation to France.
French values supposedly worked for everyone; if the former colonies did not want them, then
they must be simply too different, too degenerate to ever become French and therefore less
civilized.
57

Camiscioli, 21
Ibid, 73
59
Rosenberg, 131
60
Ibid, 117 Rosenberg does interchangeably use “Algerian” and “Kabyle” when talking about perceptions of
whiteness. Arabs were never considered white.
58

31

Even 60 years later, those students who do not plan or desire to become French may be
caught in the cross-fire of the remnants of colonial thought. France today does not recognize race
on the census and the government takes pains to show that race is not an issue. In 2015 President
Hollande even named a Moroccan-born woman, Audrey Azoulay, the Minister of Culture.61
However, it is evident from the students’ comments that many in France do see race and it is an
issue; it is simply one the government today chooses to ignore. Tamir believes that France is not
a racist country but he “confirms with force” that prejudice exists. “[The French] say ‘it’s not for
us the French to accept your culture and your customs but it’s on you to assimilate.’”62 This
comment insinuates that anyone hoping to make a life in France should accept French ways and
even calls on the old by-word “assimilate.” But why say it to a student? Why should he
completely adapt to French ways when he only came for education and experience? Comments
like this one reveal how blurry the lines are between French-North Africans, North African
immigrants and North African students. Especially when one considers that many students do
end up staying, even if they did not plan to do so at first. Their presence in France is so visible
and comes with so many strings attached, that an Arab student potentially experiences France
less like a world traveler and more like “un sale arabe,” even though he has barely arrived and
may never set foot in a banlieue or take a French person’s job.63 For some of the students, the
stereotyping becomes even narrower and more personal. The treatment of Algerians, Tunisians
and Moroccans may not differ, but the way the students perceive rude comments and dirty looks
does show some variation which reflects each nation’s individual relationship with France.
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“Tunisian people and Moroccan people, they don’t look at them the same way they look at
Algerian people.” –Abdullah.64
None of the other students spoke about differences in French views of Algerians as
explicitly as Abdullah, but there I did hear a difference in the way they spoke about feelings of
exclusion. When the Moroccan and Tunisian students spoke about racist, French attitudes, they
focused on religious practices, Islamophobia, history, and prejudice towards Arabs in general.
The Algerians talked about religion and felt that the French saw their culture as inferior, but they
also made references to origin and nationality, which the others did not.65 Aisha said that the
French do not judge people according to their abilities but “take origin as important criterion.”66
Ahmed, whose features are not stereotypically “Arab,” cited times of seeing people’s manners
towards him become less friendly and colder, not when they hear his Arabic-sounding name but
when they find out he is Algerian.67 Tamir also referenced “telling them I am Algerian” as the
cause of grimaces.68 Abdullah has felt that people attribute characteristics to him based on his
appearance and background. For example, he shared how a friend took him to see a movie, not
knowing what his favorite genre was. He turned to Abdullah and said, “oh you will really like it;
it’s an action movie with Kalashnikovs and everything.” Abdullah was taken aback and said that
no, he did not care for that type of film but prefered historical movies. The French boy said, “no,
no, I said action because I see you’re muscular and big and everything.” Abdullah considered his
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reasoning to be “n’importe quoi” (nonsense) and heavily implied that he believes his ethnicity
played a role in the friend’s choice of film for him.69
Abdullah’s assertion is not completely wrong when he makes a distinction between
Algeria and Morocco or Tunisia in French thinking. Legally, even, there is a distinction. The
Franco-Algerian Bilateral agreement of 1968 continues to regulate how Algerians immigrate,
come to study, and receive visas, even though it has been amended several times to match the
controls on other foreigners. Culturally and politically too, several differences exist between
France’s relationship with each country, which may affect public perceptions of incoming
immigrants, visitors, and students. Morocco and Tunisia carry less historical baggage (while
significant, their colonial periods are much shorter than Algeria’s), and from the outside, they are
more open and less mysterious than their neighbor, which only sends 2% of its students abroad70
and has not opened its doors to tourism in the same way. Abdullah bemoaned Algeria’s lack of
developed tourism because it does not allow the French to “see how [they] really are.” According
to him Algerians think themselves too rich to need tourism, “not like Tunisia.”71 Raina, who is
from Tunisia, thinks that “cultivated” French tourists enjoy discovering Tunisia’s “artisanal
traditions,” monuments, and art influenced by their “varied heritage, obtained from multiple
historic civilizations.”72 I do not want to say that grand disparities exist in French treatment of
Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians—indeed, visually, most people probably could not tell the
different North Africans apart and a Moroccan was one of the most vocal about not being wanted
in France. However, knowledge of history and evidence from the present make it foolish to think
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that in the average French mind there is no distinction made once they learn a student or
immigrant comes from Algeria.
All of the students except Raina acknowledged feelings or experiences of exclusion
during their stay in France, but arguably it is the French relationship with Algeria that colors its
relationships with all North Africans. French society may have no deep-rooted issues with
Moroccans or Tunisians, but they look like Algerians, come from the same place, eat the same
food, speak the same language (as far as the French probably know), and practice the same
religion. As outlined above in excerpts from Un siècle des passions algériennes, French colonists
held many racist and degrading views of Algerian Arabs and Berbers. While those views
undoubtedly grew to include other Maghrebis, in French media and politics they applied first and
foremost to Algerians, because most person-to-person interaction between France and North
Africa took place in Algeria. Later, as migrants began to flood the metropole, the vast majority
came from Algeria because its status as three departments made border-crossing easy. Often in
reading French and American literature about twentieth century immigration, the term “Algerian”
or “Arab” alone is used, and the other two countries are left out of the discussion because their
numbers and significance in French thinking were simply not as great. Therefore, the term
“Algerian” continued to be connected with discussions about immigration, threats to French
identity and culture and protecting the français de souche (native French) from the Other.
Algeria stands out for the violence, length, and emotional impact of its decolonization
and the “intensely emotional and complex relationship” it continues to engage in with
France.73Abdullah asserted that Algerians’ refusal to accept French rule “really upset them”
because they wanted Algeria more than the other two countries. Later he continued:
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They look at us first of all like a barbarian, because…like Tunisia and Morocco, they
were ok with France ok? And we were not. This is what really upset them…because they
wanted Algeria to be French. But they want Tunisia too and Morocco too but not as much
as they want Algeria….And because we rebelled against France to get our freedom they
changed the way they thought of us. Imagine people in the 50s and 60s and stuff, telling
their sons and daughters, this is how we feel is Algeria [sic], they hate us, they killed us
and stuff. They see us like this because they thought that in a period of time [sic] Algeria
is France. It’s correct they spent like 150 years or whatever in Algeria; yeah you can say
that it’s yours but it’s not yours as a matter of fact. You colonized it. You colonized
people, you terrorized people…you did a lot of things. It’s not your place and that’s why
people rebelled against and they look at us and say why you, you’re not good people
because you didn’t want to stay with us. Yeah! We don’t want you to stay in our land
ok?74
Abdullah’s comments are less valuable for their historical accuracy (for one thing, France was in
Algeria 132 years, not 150) than they are for what they say about perceptions of history and
relations between all four countries. Of course, Tunisians and Moroccans were not “ok” with
French rule, and both countries experienced unique liberation struggles with their share of
violence and repression. France did, however, relinquish them relatively easily, not because they
felt particularly threatened by the various uprisings, but in order to focus all their energies on
keeping the largest and most important colony, where an insurrection began in November 1954.
The large community of European settlers, or pieds noirs, exercised their influence on the French
government to maintain control of Algeria as well. The two smaller nations achieved
independence in 1956, six years before Algeria, allowing them to rebuild relations with France
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more quickly, while a prolonged and bloody war in Algeria caused thousands of deaths on both
sides. Suicide bombers, torture, whole cities divided in civil war between native Algerians and
pieds noirs—all of this sets Algerian independence apart and continues to weigh on memory and
conscience on both sides. Algerian historian Benjamin Stora describes the war as “l’oubli”
(forgetting) of France and “la gangrène” (festering sore) of Algeria, leaving little room to
question the effects it had on the two populations.75
Abdullah forcefully and proudly berates the French for thinking that Algeria belonged to
them while at the same time citing Algeria’s rejection of French rule as the reason France does
not welcome Algerians, and by extension, Arab-Muslims. None of the other students made such
a direct link between a specific event in history and their feelings of alienation by the French, but
it is a significant connection. Algerian independence represented an official turning point in
French thinking about Algerians and Arabs. Todd Shepard traces the linguistic shift in legal
documents in his book, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and Remaking of
France. Until halfway through the French Algerian war, Algeria was not considered a colony but
an extension of France, and, officially, Arabs could still assimilate to French culture if they tried,
or at least live peacefully alongside it. However, the years of war took their toll and even those
who supported independence did so at times because they believed that the terms “French” and
“Algerian” contained fundamental differences that could never be reconciled. With Algerian
independence, the official line changed to say that Algerian (Arab, Muslim) will never be, can
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never be, French. 76 As with colonization and pre-independence immigration, discussions of
decolonization and subsequent waves of migrants focus almost exclusively on Algeria. In
conducting research for this paper, I found it extremely difficult to find studies or articles that
dealt with the Moroccan or Tunisian experience in depth. The length, depth of involvement, and
violence of France’s presence in Algeria compared to the other two interacts with the
overwhelming use “Algerian” in discourses about Arabs in France to give the word a more
negative connotation than “Moroccan” or “Tunisian,” even though the French may treat them all
the same because of cultural and ethnic similarities. At the very least, these factors have had an
impact on Abdullah and the other Algerian students who hold their Algerian identity both with
pride and uneasiness as they sense that it sets them apart (even though only Abdullah expressed
it explicitly).
The way the French government responded to, dealt with and talked about
decolonization—especially in Algeria—set the stage for how it treated immigrants (and students)
from North Africa later. The Algerian case is so important because of the way the French saw
Algeria and because the first waves of migrants were overwhelmingly Algerian. Independence
solidified what some French had been saying all along: why try to pretend that Algerians were
French and talk about assimilation or even integration? If inability to assimilate was part of the
reason that France let go of Algeria (and its neighbors), it should come as no surprise that the
French government and people have difficulty accepting North African immigrants and their
children and grandchildren’s claim to French-ness. Integration and assimilation made up and
continue to make up the rhetoric, but clearly there has always been an underlying belief that it is
simply not possible—the differences between the two cultures are too great. The history of
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colonialism, independence, and immigration provide the context to help a present-day student
understand why these perceived insurmountable differences exist so strongly today. Besides the
historical baggage and cultural differences, my students cited one aspect of North African culture
in particular as the most difficult difference to adjust to in France. Religion, Islam in particular,
has recently elicited plenty of media attention. However, its importance in French thinking also
has deeply historical connections related to the same principles of universalism and particularism
which characterized so many French assessments of their former colonies.
“The religion is the hardest thing to adjust to” --Maram.77
Religion came up in most of the students’ responses in different ways as many of them
expressed the difficulty they felt practicing Islam in an avowedly “secular” society. During the
time I spent with Abdullah, Raina, and Ahmed, they rarely hesitated to excuse themselves to
pray the required five daily prayers, and Abdullah had no problem taking out his prayer rug and
praying even if a few of us were in the room. While I cannot speak for all of the respondents,
none of the North African Muslims with whom I spent significant time (Abdullah, Raina, Ahmed,
Mohamed, Mona, and others not included in this study) drank alcohol or ate any meat that did
not have a halal label. Of course, I also knew several Muslims in France who did not adhere to
religious customs with such fervor, but if even half of the 5 million Muslims in France observe
Islamic rules in the strictest sense, it must draw attention to them because of how minutely it
affects their lives and how much the restrictions contrast with everyday French life. For example,
when a group of American students came for the summer, the only Muslim in the group faced
opposition from the French professor leading the program when he wanted to fast during
Ramadan. The professor told the young man’s leader to talk him out of it because it would be too
difficult to fast and fully participate in activities, even though thousands of Muslims hold down
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full time jobs and families and fast every year. This situation did not involve a North African
student, but it illustrates the issues that may arise when religious practices collide with the public
sphere in France. Tamir noted that the French are “annoyed” by Islam and that they believe it is
not compatible with the republic and the idea of laïcité (secularism).78 This idea, like the idea
that Maghrebis are not able to be French, and prejudice against Algerians, can be traced back to
the colonial era and gained strength during decolonization, as religion became an important
dividing line between the two cultures.
Despite a majority mentioning that religion caused a divide between them and the French,
no one but Mona gave a specific example of how religion caused them problems. Her story is
significant nonetheless, not because it is the only example, but because of what it represents:
They turned me away from a school because of my veil; even before the law of
2004…they have said that I am repressed, extremist, because I wear the veil. They’ve
said that I am just a submissive woman; however I am a convinced feminist. People only
believe what they hear in the media.79
On the surface, this may seem to be no more than a misunderstanding of another’s culture.
According to Joan Wallach Scott, however, this young woman’s struggle to find acceptance
while wearing her headscarf serves as a focal point for French fears about religion and cultural
identity. Mona refers here to a ban on completely covering the face in France and on wearing the
“veil” in public schools.80 Scott’s book on the controversy surrounding this ban explores how
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most French arguments for and against the veil expressed decades-old French universalism
hidden in the contemporary rhetoric of feminism, national security, and laïcité because the veil
symbolized threats to “French identity.” While the ban took place in 2003, and the politics and
historical context of France had changed greatly since the Third Republic and colonialism, many
of the same themes continued to be reiterated in different ways, in particular the idea that North
Africans remain too different to be completely French (because of Islam) or the willingness of
the French state to compromise the ideal of individualism in favor of national interests.
Understanding the historical importance and application of certain ideas in France is essential to
understanding the contradictions surrounding North African students in France today. Past
relationships and prejudices explain some of this, but a historical exploration of quintessential
“French” ideals informing the headscarf controversies will illustrate the repetitiveness and even
ingrained nature of these contradictions.
The issue began in 1989 when three Muslim girls were expelled for refusing to remove
their scarves at school. At that time the state ruled that each school should have its own policies
to account for different situations. In 1994 the courts rejected proposed legislation to ban
“ostentatious” signs of religion in school, again leaving it up to individuals to decide what caused
a disturbance or seemed to be proselytizing. The media conflict died down, but the issue with
headscarves did not. Years later, attention turned to the story of two school girls who refused to
wear a more revealing scarf in school. As French girls who had converted to Islam, their story
exacerbated fears about the cultural influence of North African Muslims and preserving national
culture. This time, growing international concern about Islam created enough hype to allow
President Chirac to approve a law banning the wearing of any “conspicuous” signs of religion in
public schools. In theory this law applies equally to Christians, Muslims, and Jews, but in
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actuality, the only truly “conspicuous sign of religion” worn regularly by any of the groups
would be the Muslim headscarf or perhaps a Jewish yarmulke. Most, if not all, media attention
focused on the headscarf.
As explored in an earlier section, fears about protecting “authentic” French identity have
driven policies concerning North Africans and immigration for decades. “Western,” if not
Christian values about family, work, and society serve as a baseline for defining that identity,
even though it has often been hotly contested within France itself.81 In her book, Scott begins by
asking, why so much attention on the headscarf in particular? She points out that the small
number of women who actually wear a headscarf in France does not merit the intense reaction of
the intellectuals, politicians, and feminists who supported the ban.82 There have been no laws
regulating other signs of practicing Islam nor have people raised as much issue with French
practices which subordinate women. She suggests that because the headscarf is so visible, it
came to represent French views of all Muslims as backwards and radical—views which reach
back to the late 1800s. Focusing on what they considered extreme oppression of women made it
easier to ignore subordination in their own system and maintain their status as the “civilizer.”
Scott argues that the headscarf with its religious connotations functions as a symbol of Muslims’
“inferiority” and the need to continue the mission civilisatrice.
Equating “religious” with “backwards” may single out Muslims now, but that is perhaps
because now they are the most visible religious group in France. The French concept of laïcité
(secularism) itself extends much further back in French history than the colonial era. During the
Enlightenment and Revolutionary periods, anger at clerical domination of the absolutist
monarchy as well as new philosophies privileging reason over faith led to a complete revolt
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against church influence in state affairs. According to Scott, a version of secularism developed
which meant protecting the individual from religion, not protecting religion from the state.
Today, this supplies lawmakers with precedent to forbid “conspicuous” religious symbols. At the
same time, twin and sometimes contradictory ideologies developed that would significantly
shape French political and cultural life for generations. The revolutionaries wrote their
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,” to protect individual liberty, but they framed it
“in abstract and universal terms, suggesting that the principles it contained were valid not only in
France but throughout the world.”83 This tension between individualism and universalism led the
government to champion individual rights, but only if those individuals conformed to the
“national” culture the leaders created. During the Third Republic (1870-1914), laws would be set
in place which both confirmed individual liberty and emphasized national unity. The “Ferry laws”
prioritized loyalty to the state over loyalty to any other institution, in particular the Catholic
Church. Their creators wanted a public school system which banned religious education and
sought to indoctrinate French children with republican ideology.84 Over time, insistence on the
universalism of French Republican and secular values fueled much of the government’s activity
in North Africa and later its policies towards immigrants and their children. The headscarf ban is
simply a more recent expression, and spills into the lives of students who came to France for
opportunity and may or may not decide to stay.
Republican individualism and universalism drove the ban, but, as Scott points out, were
simultaneously contradicted by it. Proponents of the ban described the veil as an imposition of
Islam because to them no woman would wear a veil voluntarily—in a French context, it simply
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makes no sense.85 However, Scott insists again and again that many girls chose to wear the scarf
as a personal, religious conviction, not a mandate from a radical Muslim family. Scott
emphasizes that this ban, which was meant to create an ideal, homogenous nation (by removing
that which made some girls different), actually contributed to the rift between North African
Muslims and native French. For example, girls who put the scarf back on after school are
constantly reminded that France legally rejects a significant part of their identity. The ban
created so much tension around the idea of the “veil” that even women legally allowed to wear it,
such as Mona, face discrimination or at least disapproval in other areas of life. The law, like
those passed regarding immigrants in the twenties, or “Muslim Europeans” in the forties,
narrowly defined the Muslim community and set it up in opposition to a superior, white, French
one. This apparently unsolvable dichotomy between “French” and “Muslim” (which in France
can often be synonymous with “Arab”) affects even those students who have no desire to
become French. For those who do wish to pursue a life in France, it potentially causes greater
problems.
The importance of religion in French policy and perceptions of North Africans is
proportional to its prominence in the lives of many Maghrebis and even this importance has
historical roots. Arab invaders introduced Islam to the region in the seventh century and its
importance grew over time, eventually becoming a significant dividing line between colonizers
and colonized. Shephard examines twentieth-century legal documents and reports concerning
Algeria and its inhabitants to show how legal documents before and after 1962 shaped opinions
about relations between France and Algeria. Even though until 1962 all non-Europeans living in
Algeria were technically French subjects, there was a consistent distinction made between
“French Europeans,” “French Muslims,” and “Jews.” A short time later, liberation and national
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movements in North Africa relied heavily on religion to legitimize their cause and unite the
people. Willis states:
In all three countries, Islam became an important rallying cry for the nationalist
organizations…Islam has historically always played a central role in Maghrebi
politics: most notably in legitimizing political authority and activism. In this sense
the importance given to Islam should not be surprising. The fact that nationalism
was articulating opposition to rule by European non-Muslims further strengthened
this tendency. Moreover, the fact that colonial authorities themselves increasingly
used religion (rather than the more complex markers of ethnicity and language) to
differentiate and discriminate the settlers from the native population—referring to
the latter as ‘Muslims’—added further to this.86
All three countries used Islam to rally people to fight for independence, and all three
continued to use Islam as an identifying feature of their post-independence states. The
importance of religion is not lost on the students now coming to France from North Africa; rather
it is highlighted by them. Whether or not they know the historical roots of the conflict, they feel
that their religion is what separates them most from the French. It is important to see that the
tension that caused some students to state “religion” as a one-word answer to why they think
some French are racist, goes back to the colonial era, and that the continual importance of Islam
in the students’ daily lives (as evidenced by their responses and by my own experiences living
with them) has been shaped by the importance of Islam in their nations’ histories. These histories
are marked by exploitation, racism, torture, discrimination, and now, terrorism. Even though
trying to “colonize the native” is passé, lingering attitudes of cultural superiority (when coupled
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with more recent fear of Islam) causes students like Mona and Ahmed to feel uncomfortable
expressing their faith in France.
Conclusion
Studying abroad can be nerve-wracking, and choosing to obtain a degree of some sort in
a foreign country is an even bigger and potentially scarier step into the unknown. But for a
French major traveling from the U.S. to France in Spring 2015, nerves were well concealed
under the excitement of discovering a romanticized French culture and cuisine. The move is
jarring, but one heads across the ocean assured of being at least civilly treated, if not welcomed
with open arms. There may be significant differences between French and American culture but
an American student may avoid confrontation using discretion and knowledge of the language
and she shares a recent history with her French counterparts as citizens of two rich, more
powerful nations in the world. Despite fears about “Americanization” (a fear that parallels
anxiety about “Arab” culture today), the historical relationship between France and the U.S. has
been one of reciprocal aid and cultural sharing.
Recent scholarship tends to emphasize the divergences in this relationship, focusing on
the post-World War II “Americanization” of France as an uneven distribution of cultural power
between the longtime allies. Stereotypically, one thinks of a culturally “superior” Frenchman
looking down on American tourists and visitors while simultaneously feeling threatened by them.
Whitney Walton calls into the question this standard narrative of American-French student
exchanges in her book, Internationalism, National Identities and Study Abroad: "instead of
Americanization and anti-Americanization as the dominant modes of Franco-American cultural
relations, this history of study abroad narrates a relationship between equals, in which curiosity
and fascination undergo reality checks, and lived experience transforms stereotypes into nuanced
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understanding."87 According to her, the relationships between American students and France and
French students and America was and is one of mutual sharing, learning, “reassessing one’s
national identity, and creating a more cosmopolitan self.”88 This “cosmopolitan” exchange of
ideas extended beyond the realm of student exchanges to include other spheres such as tourism.89
Vanessa R. Schwartz demonstrates how the French and American film industries of the fifties
and sixties also reflect a mutual, cultural fascination and exchange.90 Current programs such as
The University of Akron’s regular teacher and student exchanges with the Université du Maine
testify to a continuance of that mutual fascination. On the other hand, there is little to no
reciprocity between France and the Maghreb, whether in the flow of students or the exchange of
cultural ideas. Because of this, students coming from the Maghreb carry the status of “foreign
student” with a different weight. While Americans, Germans, Italians, Koreans, and others
usually explore France for six months to a year, most likely with few problems beyond the usual
culture shock, Maghrebis studying in France come half-expecting to stay and experience ample
misunderstandings and even outright racism.
While not representative of all North African students in France, the stories of this group
reflect a history of inequality that continues into the present. Although many of these students
engaged in international student life, I found that they do not quite fit usual Western or American
molds for study-abroad students or even into the broader category of international students. I
define study abroad as a short-term stay (five weeks to a year) for academic credit at the home
institution, while an international student is pursuing a degree on a long-stay visa or residence
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permit.91 Of the students in this study, all but one fall under the category of international student,
but I knew several in France who only came for 2-3 months to conduct post-graduate research. In
her book, The Other Americans in Paris, Nancy Green calls for a reexamination of who
comprised the American contingent in Paris during the early twentieth century. Here I have tried
to shed light on an unexamined group of international students: the children of the colonized
studying chez the former colonizer. They do not identify with the second-generation immigrant
fight to be recognized as fully French, nor do they have any personal memories of oppression
with which to come to terms. In the case of my demographic, they hardly seem to have inherited
stories from parents and grandparents about the horrors or inconveniences of colonialism. Rather
than coming to experience a new language or culture, these students said they came because of
language and culture and for better educational and occupational opportunities. The latter may be
true of any student group from a developing country, but Abdullah’s “link” and the complex
emotional and intellectual responses of these students to racism can only be read in light of
history. Studies on international students find that feelings of isolation, culture clashes and
misunderstandings are normal, and my purpose here is not to diagnose these students with some
latent cultural inferiority complex brought on by a colonialism which ended sixty years ago. At
the same time, many of the students did mention a “colonial past” without prompting, and they
often attributed feelings of rejection to their culture or religion specifically, not to some broad
French xenophobia. At the end of the day, when they leave the campus (and sometimes whilst on
it) they experience France more like an unwanted immigrant than as a foreign student. No matter
how unwelcomed a U.S. student feels in France, he or she will never have to come to terms with
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the fact that this people occupied and oppressed their own in the past and still continues to
represent the best opportunity for a globally competitive education.
Looking at the international student experience in a historical context allows for a greater
understanding of their experience and can allow for more effective cross-cultural interactions. It
also presents a wonderful opportunity for the historian or sociologist to better understand how
world-shaping events such as colonialism and decolonization continue to influence this
generation of students, workers and travelers. Whether it is Pakistani and Indian students in
Britain, African Americans in the United States or North and West Africans in France, singling
out students from a formerly colonized group who pursue higher education from their historical
oppressors offers a unique vision of those oppressors and a different lens through which to view
history.

Appendix A: Biographies
Abdullah is a 24 year old in his second year of Masters (called M2 in France) studying American
Literature at the Université du Maine. He had been in France one year at the time of our
interview and holds a Bachelor degree in Psychology and a Masters in English from Algeria.
While he learned some French in elementary school, he spoke better English, because he did not
seriously began studying French until he arrived in Le Mans. Nonetheless, he spoke freely and
never had any problems understanding or being understood. He wants to obtain his degree and
find work in the Gulf Countries or Canada before one day returning to Algeria. Our interviews
were conducted over skype in French and English.
Ahmed is also from Algeria, but strongly identifies as Berber in culture and language rather than
Arabic. He had recently graduated from the Université du Maine with his MBA and was living
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and working in Paris when we spoke over skype. At this point he plans to stay. Because his
father and brothers live in Paris, he was very familiar with France but had only been living there
a little over a year. Thanks to his French education, he spoke almost like a native, but still had a
slight accent.
Raina spent 10 weeks at the Université du Maine in 2015 doing research for her doctoral thesis
in Biology and Biotechnology. She is 30, unmarried and obtained her Master’s in Tunisia in
2010. She spoke excellent French, since she has been studying it since age 7 as her second
language. Although she filled out the questionnaire, I became close with her during her stay in
France and had many conversations with her about Tunisian culture.
Mona is unique in the sample in that she has spent most of her life in France. Born in Morocco,
her parents moved to France for better work opportunities when she was a baby. She is 21 years
old and in her last year of License (or L3—the French equivalent of a Senior) at the Université
du Maine studying engineering. She also identifies most with the Berber culture and although
she grew up in France, still holds only Moroccan nationality. She is working on her English and
eventually wants to complete a PhD in England. Mona also became a friend during my stay,
although her schedule prevented us from spending much time together.
Mohamed is also in L3 at the Université du Maine studying mechanical engineering. He arrived
in 2014 from Morocco to attain his License. He is 21 and has been studying French since
primary school. He is very active on the campus and with other international students, working at
reception in the cité universitaire (dorms), organizing soccer tournaments and planning soirées
to encourage interaction between French and international students. Mohamed was in the larger
circle of friends with whom I spent most of my time in France.
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Nora has been in France since 2011 and is now working on her master’s in business at the
Université du Maine. She recently married a relative from Morocco who also lives in France and
plans to stay. She is 23 and has been speaking French for 16 years. I met Nora during my first
week in Le Mans and she helped me during the beginning of my stay. However I did not see her
often after the first few weeks because of her schedule.
Aisha is from Algeria, considers herself to be Berber and is in M1 studying finance in Paris. She
has been in France for a year, but learned the language before coming. She is a friend of Ahmed
who was gracious enough to fill out my questionnaire.
Maram is Algerian and is working on her doctor’s degree in business administration in Paris. She
has been in France for a little more than a year and is also a friend of Ahmed. She also learned
French at home and had been a tourist several times before coming to study, which she
acknowledged is a very different experience. She plans to stay in French for two years.
Bahja came to France in 2014 to study entrepreneurial dynamics and strategic innovation in Paris.
She learned French in Algeria and considers herself Berber. She wants to stay a long time.
Tamir has been in France for two years and plans to stay long term. He is Algerian and Berber
and also grew up learning French. He is in M2 for finance and accounting and lives in St. Denis
(a neighborhood in Paris where many Algerians live) with his wife.
Hisham is in M2 at the Université du Maine studying environmental toxicology. He had only
been in France for three months at the time of filling out the questionnaire and said he’s been
studying French the same amount of time. He identifies as both Arab and Berber and plans to
stay for two years to obtain his degree.
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Lais had been in France 4 months at the time of filling out the questionnaire but studied French
for 14 years in Algeria. He is a master’s in architecture at the Université du Maine. Like Hisham,
he identifies as Berber and plans to stay for two years in France for his degree.
Appendix B: Questionnaire
The questionnaire went through many drafts as I spoke with different students and found new
ways of coming at the questions. As my formal questionnaire evolved, I asked several students
supplemental questions over email if they had missed a question or if they had not responded
with enough detail. This version is the final draft and represents in essence what I asked
everyone, including those with whom I conducted oral interviews.
QUESTIONNAIRE | Les étudiants maghrébins au Mans
Les réponses à ce questionnaire me permettront de collecter les données nécessaires à ma
rédaction finale pour ma License aux États-Unis. Si vous préfériez de rester anonyme, il ne faut
pas inclure votre nom/prénom. Même si vous incluiez vos identifiants, je ne vais utiliser que des
prénoms dans la présentation de la recherche.
Nom, Prénom :
Spécialité:
Encerclez la bonne réponse. Si vous répondez électroniquement, s’il vous plaît, tapez vos
réponses en bleu.
Quelle est votre nationalité?
Possédez-vous la double nationalité?
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Votre père vient-il de quel pays?
Votre mère vient-elle de quel pays?
Vous vous identifiez LE PLUS avec quelle culture (langue, traditions, valeurs, cuisine, arts,
histoire)?
Si vous vous identifiez avec la culture d’un ou plus d’autre pays, indiquez le(s)quel(s):
Est-ce que vous avez appris la langue française avant de venir en France?
Si oui, vous parlez français depuis combien de temps?
Vous habitez/habitiez quelle ville pendant votre séjour en France ?
Vous êtes en France depuis/vous avez resté en France pour combien de temps?
Si vous n’avez pas encore quitté la France, tu comptes à rester pour combien de temps?
Pourquoi est-ce que vous avez décidé de venir en France ?
Est-ce que vous voulez rester en France? Ou peut-être habiter dans un autre pays?
En répondant aux questions suivantes, vous pouvez écrire autant que vous voulez. J’apprécierais
si vous essayerais d’être aussi honnête et franc que possible. S’il vous plaît, tapez vos réponses
en bleu.
Comment est-ce que vous trouvez les français et la culture française?
Ils étaient quoi vos idées sur les français avant de venir? D’où provenaient ces idées ?
Est-ce qu’elles étaient confirmées ou pas?
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À vous, c’est quoi la plus grande différence entre votre culture et la culture française?
C’est quoi la différence le plus difficile à laquelle vous deviez vous ajuster?
Quand vous êtes arrivé, comment étiez-vous vous adapté à la “culture shock”?
Est-ce que vous avez pour la plupart les amis d’origine maghrébine, européenne ou autre?
Quelles étaient vos expectations de votre vie en France? (Sur les gens, la culture, l’éducation, la
situation des immigres/étudiants étrangers) Comment est-ce que ces expectations étaient-elles
réalisées?
Qu’est-ce que vous pensiez à la France avant de venir? Est-ce que ça a changé? Comment?
On parle dans la presse du racisme en France contre les Arabes/musulmans. Est-ce que vous avez
jamais éprouvé des expériences de racisme en France (même si ce n’était pas contre vous)? Si
oui, la-décrivez.
À votre avis, pourquoi quelques français sont-ils racistes ?
À votre avis, comment votre culture est-elle vue par les français?
Trouvez-vous que votre expérience en France a changé vos perceptions de votre pays? De vousmême?
Quelle était la réaction de votre famille et vos amis quand vous avez décidé d’aller en France
pour les études ?
À votre avis, pourquoi est-ce que les jeunes de votre pays choisissent la France pour faire les
études ?
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C’est normal pour un étudiant étranger de se sentir différent ou sans place dans le nouveau
environnement. Est-ce que vous vous êtes senti des sentiments de différence ou d’exclusion ou
de mal à l’aise spécifiquement à cause de l’histoire entre ton pays et la France (par exemple, dans
vos relations avec les profs ou les autres étudiants) ?
Comment trouvez-vous que vous vous situez dans l’histoire de l’immigration Nord-Africaine
vers la France ? Est-ce que vous vous voyez comme immigré ou comme étudiant étrangère ?
Comment pensez-les français vous-voient ?
J'accepte qu’une partie ou la totalité de mes réponses soient utilisée dans la présentation finale de
cette recherche:
Veuillez envoyer les réponses à hmu3@zips.uakron.edu
Je vous remercie de votre participation.
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